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Abstract
The emotional involvement of participants in a conversation not only shows in
the words they speak and in the way they speak and gesture but also in their
turn-taking behavior. This paper reviews research into computational mod-
els of embodied conversational agents. We focus on models for turn-taking
management and (social) emotions. We are particularly interested in how in
these models emotions of the agent itself and those of the others influence
the agent’s turn-taking behavior and vice versa how turn-taking behavior of
the partner is perceived by the agent itself. The system of turn-taking rules
presented by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) is often a starting point
for computational turn-taking models of conversational agents. But emo-
tions have their own rules besides the “one-at-a-time” paradigm of the SSJ
system. It turns out that almost without exception computational models of
turn-taking behavior that allow “continuous interaction” and “natural turn-
taking” do not model the underlying psychological, affective, attentional and
cognitive processes. They are restricted to rules in terms of a number of
superficially observable cues. On the other hand computational models for
virtual humans that are based on a functional theory of social emotion do
not contain explicit rules on how social emotions affect turn-taking behavior
or how the emotional state of the agent is affected by turn-taking behavior
of its interlocutors. We conclude with some preliminary ideas on what an
architecture for emotional turn-taking should look like and we discuss the
challenges in building believable emotional turn-taking agents.
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Life is emotion. Emotions make us move, fight or flight, approach or
withdraw. Some emotions, such as fear, anger, and disgust refer to the
basic values of our lives. These emotions sometimes take over the control of
our behavior, in particular when the situation asks an immediate response.
Sometimes for good, sometimes for bad. People can recognize feelings that
others have, because they show in the human face, or in the way someone
speaks, or behaves. But also seeing an image of a human face, we recognize
happiness or sadness. People play emotions in theater, in movies, but also in
their daily life. In cartoons and movies we can recognize characters having
certain emotions.
Having conversations makes up a good deal of our social lives. The emo-
tions of people having a conversation not only show in the content of their
contributions, in their gestures, body postures and expressions but also in the
moments they talk, or do not talk, in their “turn-taking” behavior. In many
cultures people in conversation try to follow the convention of “one-talks-at-
a-time” but when the temperature of the conversation raises they often do
not adhere anymore to this rule. In an animated conversation people talk at
the same time. When someone is attacking someone verbally we can imagine
that the addressed one becomes angry if he feels that he is treated unfair.
It is believable for us that the anger makes the insulted addressee defend
himself by trying to stop the speaker talking. Sometimes people apologize
for interrupting the speaker. Apparently because they feel they did behave in
an impolite way. What makes people having a conversation act the way they
do? In what situations do emotions (more than rational decisions) make lis-
teners interrupt the speaker, and say what they say the way they say it? And
when, after the fact, do they feel sorry for it? And, when do they apologize
for their behavior?
In many professions a great part of the work consists of having conver-
sations. Think of the policeman who has to interrogate a suspect, the street
worker who has to negotiate with a youth group, the practitioner who has to
deliver the outcome of the medical search to his patient. They apply “conver-
sational techniques” (Dutch: gesprekstechnieken) and develop conversational
skills (Dutch: gespreksvaardigheden) to increase the chance that their con-
versations have the desired outcome. This outcome is not only that they give
or receive some information, or that they motivate or warn their clients to
behave in a certain way, more importantly they want to build on qualities
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of a social relation that brings them further. Rules and procedures how to
handle, what stance to take (“be an active listener”, “show empathy”), or
how empathy is expressed (say ‘we’, not ‘you’ !) are trained by means of
role play.1 Can virtual humans play a role in training scenarios with similar
learning effects as human players? This requires that virtual humans un-
derstand what goes on in the minds of their conversational partners. They
should also be able to express and understand the emotions that play in a
given situation. They have to be able to predict the effect of their own stance
on the stance that the other takes.2 One of the basic conversational skills
is to know when to take the turn and what it means when someone starts
talking out of turn, or remains silent when he is expected to give an answer.
Technology is based on our ability to reflect, detach, objectify and com-
bine aspects from the live stream of events. Language technology, for exam-
ple, is possible because of the abstraction of the language from the actual and
meaningful expression of thought by some speaker in a practical encounter
with other humans. We can observe what people say or do “from the out-
side”. We can detach from the actual event as it is experienced the abstract
form of a sequence of sounds, and record it. So we can transcend “what
happens” as something in itself from the stream of life. This allows us to
transpose the imaginations of our intellect to other times and reconstruct, re-
produce them. We can thus say something without meaning it, or let others
say something without meaning it. Our intellect is able to distinguish such
things as the “truth value”, the “propositional content”, “the sound”, “the
grammatical form”, and the organ that produces the sound. In the same
way we can abstract and objectify such things as “small behaviors” from the
concrete person that we meet in a social encounter.3 We can classify and la-
1For a Dutch group that organizes training sessions for learning how to deal in “complex
conversations” see www.wildekastanje.nl
2See for example Timothy Leary’s Rose on the effect of our acting on social relation-
ships.
3Goffman defines the subject of interaction analysis as those “small behaviors” such as
an eye blink, a head movement, etc. that people make in conversations. “The subject mat-
ter however, can be identified. It is that class of events which occur during co-presence
and by virtue of co-presence. The ultimate behavioral materials are the glances, ges-
tures, positionings, and verbal statements that people continuously feed into the situation
whether intended or not. These are the external signs of orientation and involvement -
states of mind and body not ordinarily examined with respect to their social organization.”
(Introduction of Goffman (1967)).
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bel these behaviors as we do with flowers or insects. A person then becomes
“someone who shows these behaviors”. We can copy these behaviors as we
can copy images and sounds. We can reproduce the sentences and let them
be pronounced by a speaker, a device, making the impression of a truthful
and original expression, a statement that reflects a position that someone
takes. This impression of a genuine encounter with a real person can be very
strong even though we know that these fabricated speakers are only virtual.
This impression works in the same way as the image remind us of the original
event. The photo of our relatives makes them present for us, the moment
when the photo is presented to us, because of some memorized resemblance.
The voice of the answering machine not only presents the person that we
recognize but also pretends the actual presence of the person whose voice we
recognize. In this technological world of make belief and experience design
we work on the construction of believable animated conversational agents,
graphical as well as robots, that “pretend” to have emotions and that try to
become inhabitants of our social life.
The idea of a “believable character” originates from theater and other
media arts. “It does not mean an honest or reliable character but one that
provides the illusion of life and thus permits the audiences suspension of
disbelief.”(Bates 1994). “Artificial intelligence researchers trying to create
engaging apparently living creatures may find important insight in the work
of artists who have explored the idea of believable characters. In particular..
appropriately timed and clearly expressed emotion is a central requirement
for believable characters.” Bates (1994) quotes from a classic work on Disney
animations.
Disney animation makes audiences really believe in characters
whose adventures and misfortunes make people laugh and even
cry. There is a special ingredient in our type of animation that
produces drawings that appear to think and make decisions and
act of their own volition it is what creates the illusion of life.
The first and most important lesson learned from the artists is the impor-
tance of emotion expressions in these characters. “The apparent desires of a
character and the way the character feels about what happens in the world
with respect to those desires are what make us care about that character.
If the character does not react emotionally to events if they don’t care then
neither will we. The emotionless character is lifeless as a machine.” Goals
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and needs and the agent’s appraisals of events with respect to these goals and
needs are key to producing a clearly defined emotional state in the creature.
The situation in which the creature is affectively involved should be made
clear to the spectator.
Virtual humans are computer animations of human characters that can
play roles in specific scenarios. They interact and have conversations with
other virtual humans or with real humans. These animated embodied con-
versational agents (ECAs) can have a realistic or cartoon-like body and they
can engage in spoken discourse and dialogue. They can use voice with appro-
priate prosody and intonation, synchronize their mouth movements to the
words uttered, make gestures, assume postures, and produce facial expres-
sion and communicative gaze behavior Poggi et al. (2005). These animated
conversational characters are increasingly used in a wide range of different ap-
plication areas, including virtual training environments (Traum et al. (2005),
Prendinger and Ishizuka (2001)), in task-oriented dialog systems represent-
ing agents that help users find their way in virtual environments (Hofs et al.
(2010)), in storytelling systems (Theune et al. (2004)),in serious games such
as Siren, a multi-player game for learning how to resolve social conflicts Yan-
nakakis et al. (2010), as well as in e-commerce applications where computer
agents play a role as sales assistant (Gebhard et al. (2003)).
Some authors see “special links, or bonds” between users and ECAs,
in applications where the ECA functions as the presentation of a personal
coach or companion4 (Bickmore and Picard (2005) and Shearer et al. (2007)).
For establishing such a long term relationship engagement, cognitive and
emotional involvement as well as commitment are key factors. If this is the
case, then for an ECA to be able to establish and maintain relations, it
must be endowed with mechanisms that allow it to perceive, adapt to and
generate behaviors relating to attention and emotional involvement (Peters
et al. (2005)).
Artificial embodied conversational agents should show appropriate and
coherent emotional and emphatic behavior and know the social rules of turn-
taking. They should be able to regulate the flow of the conversation showing
4“By Companions we mean conversationalists or confidants not robots but rather
computer software agents whose function will be to get to know their owners over a long
period. Those may well be elderly or lonely, and the contributions in the book focus not
only on assistance via the internet (contacts, travel, doctors etc.) but also on providing
company and Companionship, by offering aspects of real personalization.” (Wilks (2009))
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the gestures and expressions that fit their emotional state and the situation.
Just like humans such agents are able to do many things “at the same time”.
When speaking they can observe what listeners do and react on the feedback
they give. They can stop speaking immediately when some event suddenly
requires immediate attention. These computer animations require computer
architectures based on complex models of agents that show emotional con-
versational behavior when interacting with other virtual or real characters.
In this report we discuss computational models of turn taking and emo-
tions in conversations as well as architectures and systems that are based
on these models. Since the computational turn in psychology it is a well-
established idea that we “understand” how the human mind “works” by
building computational models and by implementing these models as com-
puter programs. We do not discuss here the principal psychological and philo-
sophical issues raised by the view that the mind is a computational system,
what Margareth Boden called the computational metaphor (Boden (1979)).
We are interested in these models because we want to make computer agents
that have build in conversational skills. These animated conversational char-
acters show “believable emotional and conversational behavior” in the eyes
of humans that observe or interact with these agents. We build systems
that make believable impressions so that humans get engaged in a dialogue
with these agents. We do this in such a way that humans react verbally and
non-verbally in a social way to the acts of these agents. The criterium for
success of our work is how these animations are perceived by humans in some
situation and scenario of use, measured by how they assess and response to
these artifacts’ behaviors. This type of animations may show their practical
value beyond their value to entertain, in the same way as images, statues,
video recordings, theater and role plays have shown their value in everyday
life.5
If we say that virtual humans “have emotions”, “talk” or “behave” we
5“What minimal model of the actor is needed if we are to wind him up, stick him in
amongst his fellows, and have an orderly traffic of behavior emerge?” This formulation
used by Goffmann in the Introduction of his Interaction Rituals (1967!) to present the
main theme of the bundle of essays already shows that for the researcher who studies these
abstract “small behaviors” the actor could as well be a real human as an artificial virtual
agent. It’s primarily “the moments” that count, not the men. The question is how this
abstraction works out if we apply these artificial social agents. A question we will not
consider here.
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mean that in a metaphorical sense, not in the genuine sense of the word.
A stone doesn’t know Newton’s law, a plant doesn’t know it’s spring time,
and puppets don’t cry. It is normal language use to say that computers or
systems act or do something, or even behave in a certain way, even if we
know that we don’t mean that literally as if this implies that they are the
active subjects of these activities in the way humans are the authors and
actors of their genuine behaviors. Picard and Klein put it this way:
When we refer to “affect perception” or to “recognition of af-
fect” we do not intend to imply that machines are conscious or
human-like in how they perform such tasks. Our usage is one of
convenience; we lack a better short phrase to replace what we
really mean by machine affect recognition: “a computer system
employing techniques such as signal sensing and detection, pat-
tern analysis, probabilistic inference, and dynamic reasoning, in
order to extract and characterise relevant patterns of sensed data
in a way that produces a result similar to what a human would
have produced if he or she had tried to observe and characterise
the inputs according to their affective qualities.” (Picard and
Klein (2002), p.4)
It is difficult to avoid this analogical and metaphorical language use when
talking about technology. The reason for this is that this technology works
precisely by virtue of the fact that what the physical processes stand for
are the meaningful signals and patterns that makes their very sense for us
as designers and users of this technology. Moreover, that we don’t see our
own activities as the causes of the work of the machine, but instead conceive
this working as something that is done “by the machine itself” is because
of the abstract -representational and arbitrary- relation between our acts
(the inputs to the system) and what the machine does and what it produces
as output. The computer is based on a relation between our acts and the
computation which is only representational: what we do when we set the
machine to calculate cannot be understand as the cause of the computational
work done by the machine itself.
Ethical issues related to misconceptions and confusions caused by these
artifacts or by abuse of this type of artifacts need to be considered but are
not at stake here.
9
1.1. Organisation of this report
Turn can be intuitively defined as “the talk of one party bounded by the
talk of others”. But in “it’s my turn now” turn refers to a social convention.
Moreover, can non-verbal acts also fill in a turn space? Or silence for that
matter. The notion of turn, which is central in turn-taking theory, is as basic
as it is debated. In section 2 we discuss the turn taking model and we review
the critical comments that it received from various research areas.
In section 3 we discuss two architectures for turn-talking. One is based
on the turn taking model, the second alternative is based on the idea of
“continuous multi-modal interaction” (Reidsma et al. (2010)) and the fact
that the agent while speaking should also “simultaneously” be attentive to
the addressees, who continuously provide him with feedback on the words
he is saying. See Simon (1967) for an early account of what this implies
for AI and Akker and Heylen (2007) for the analysis of “feedback loops” in
conversations.
In section 4 we discuss what it means for virtual humans to have emotions
and why embodied conversational agents should have emotions. In section 5
we discuss emotion models. A computational model of emotion must explain
both “the rapid dynamics of some emotional reactions” as well as “the slower
responses that follow deliberation” (Marsella and Gratch (2009)). We discuss
the relation between (social) emotions and turn taking. In section 6 we
discuss architectures for emotional agents. In the section 7 we sketch a
design for an architecture that incorporates the relations between emotions
and turn-taking behavior. In section 8 we end with a conclusion and a
discussion about the challenges in future work in building emotional natural
turn taking agents.
2. The turn taking model of interaction
In this section we review the turn-taking model6 Goodwin said:
In the abstract, the phenomenon of turn-taking seems quite easy
to define. The talk of one party bounded by the talk of others
6According to Duncan (1972a) the term “turn taking” has been independently sug-
gested by Yngve, 1970, and by Goffman (in a personal communication with Duncan, June
5, 1970). Schegloff (1968) proposed the “basic rule for conversations: one party at a time”,
p.1076.
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constitutes a turn, with turn-taking being the process through
which the party doing the talk of the moment is changed. (cita-
tion from Thorisson (2002), p.175).
However, as soon as we start to analyse natural conversational behavior,
watch video recordings as Yngve and his collaborators did, the phenomena
force us to reconsider this definition. We start with Yngve’s idea to model
the “state of mind” of the participants in a conversation and how this is
related to the conversational flow (Yngve (1970)). Yngve’s work and that of
his followers lays ground for the kind of research needed to build artificial
agents that can show natural conversational behavior in a principled way.
Then we review the turn taking model of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, the
SSJ model (Sacks et al. (1974)). The notion of turn and the SSJ model are
highly debated. In subsection 2.3 we review the main comments on the SSJ
model.
2.1. Yngve: a theory of mind for turn taking
At the occasion of the sixth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic
Society held in April 1970, Victor H. Yngve addresses the audience with a
report of preliminary descriptive work within what he sees as “a new linguistic
framework related to state of mind.” 7
State of mind is postulated to contain all of the relevant contex-
tual information, linguistic and non-linguistic, that the language
user needs when carrying on communicative activity. (..) Within
this broader linguistic framework, the basic research task that one
faces is to discover and describe the structure of state of mind and
to relate it to communicative behavior.”Yngve (1970), p.567.
According to Yngve, the passing of the turn from one party to another is
“nearly the most obvious aspect of conversation”.(p.568). This is based on
intuition as well as on the observation that the one who has the turn is more
engaged in speaking activities and the part who does not have the turn is
more engaged in listening activities. Be it that also those who do not have
7Prof. Victor Yngve is a key witness of the earliest days of computational linguistics.
He was the first chairman of the Association of Computational Linguistics, founded in
June 1962. Yngve was also the author of COMIT, the first string processing language.
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the turn do sometimes talk, and having the turn doesn’t necessarily imply
actually speaking. Then, a remark is made that contains an interesting hint
for an agent model.
One might be tempted to set up a concept of turn as an aspect
of or belonging to the conversation itself as a social phenomenon.
However, we do have to treat the case where the parties to the
conversation differ as to whom they think has the turn. In such
cases it may be difficult to determine who “really” (quotes by
Yngve) has the turn, if there is any such thing. Even if it could
be determined who really has the turn when the parties differed
in this respect, it would seem to be irrelevant for our purposes, for
each person in a conversation acts according to his own concept
of who has the turn, that is, according to his own state of mind,
and this is all that we need in accounting for his behavior. Thus,
we are led to set up, as part of the state of mind of each person
in a conversation, a turn variable which takes various values, de-
pending on who the person thinks has the turn. We this account
for the difference in a person’s behavior between when he thinks
he has the turn and when he thinks he doesn’t.
(italics by the authors)
These considerations touch the core problem of communication, since
what holds for the turn holds for all variables that make up the state of mind
of the partners. Yngve and his collegues observed dialogs and dialog agents.
They looked at turn taking behavior in particular. What did they find?
• They confirmed that speaking and listening activities go on simulta-
neously and that it is common for messages to flow simultaneously in
both directions between partners. Yngve’s paper is the source for the
notion of the back channel, a short reassuring message (“yes” and “uh-
huh”) that the one who has the turn receives without relinquishing the
turn.8
8Backchannels are a sign of attentive listening. Teaching materials for learning conver-
sational skills for professionals recommend the learner to use these to signal attentiveness
and to stimulate the speaker to tell his story.” From the Dutch report “JGZ-richtlijn
secundaire preventie kindermishandeling”: “Door het stellen van open vragen krijgen de
12
• They found that there is not only a difference between the roles of
speaker and hearer, and the roles of having the turn or not, but there
is a further distinction of having the floor or not. Yngve uses the term
floor in the everyday sense of the word, without defining it. The mean-
ing of the notion of floor has shift from turn to a more encompassing
idea of attentive cognitive space. The notion of “floor” in conversa-
tion structure was first introduced by Sacks (1972), who regarded floor
and turn at speaking as equivalent concepts (Hayashi (1991)). Edelsky
(1981) studies data from faculty meetings. She was one of the first who
claimed that floor and turn are not equivalent and defined floor as a
psychologically developed, interactional space among the interactants.
Hayashi (1991) revises the theory of floor that she presented previously
and claims that floor is a form of community competence. “That is, it
is a kind of competence that is developed in the cognitive space nat-
urally or by mutual efforts when more than two persons interact with
each other.”
About the social emotional aspects of floor Hayashi says:
Floor reflects social considerations of power, solidarity, coop-
eration, conflict, competition and the like. (...) Speaker and
hearer’s empathic involvement in their interlocutors and the
on-going topic is one of the determinants of floor structure
and management.
(Hayashi (1991), p. 7)
• They observed that there mostly is a smooth flow of conversation, “they
proceed without a hitch”, with each party switching his turn variable
(sic!) at the appropriate time and in the appropriate way.” (The
question can be asked here, how Yngve knows this, what then is the
“appropriate time and place”? We think there is no other “evidence”
than the “smoothness of the conversation”.)
• They postulate that there are conventional signals that segment the
speech into “paragraphs” and that are related to turn switches. “The
ouders of de jeugdige de gelegenheid om hun eigen verhaal te vertellen. Hierbij luistert de
JGZ medewerker actief en stimuleert door houding, knikken, hummen et cetera.” (RIVM
Rapport 295001012/2010 M.M. Wagenaar-Fischer et al., 2010)
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only way to account for the smooth flow of conversation and the rapid
and frequent switching of turns is to suppose that there are conventional
signals exchanged during conversation that function to switch the turn
variables properly during conversation.” Yngve takes the existence of
these signals for granted. But, conventional signals don’t come out
of the blue. Where do they come from? And, how do the partners
in conversation and we as outside observers know that they use these
signals in the conventional way?
• An important observation that Yngve makes is that the relation be-
tween signals and meaning is not simple one to one. There is a great
variability in occurrence.
• There is a link between the turn variable of the state of mind and
other parts of the state of mind, such as the subject or topic of the
conversation, and the listener’s prior state of knowledge concerning the
referent of a referential expression.
• The smooth operation of the turn change is closely associated with the
obvious structural coherence of what is happening.
• The way someone interrupts or indicates he wants to say something is
by means of subtle signals, such as a slight opening of the mouth and
intake of breath accompanied by a slight tilting of the head. However,
on some occasions it seems to work, on some occasions not.
• Concerning politeness Yngve reports that one gets the impression that
there are only certain points where a polite interruption can come.
“One gets the impression of the closure of activities at various levels
and that only interruptions appropriate to the level of closure would be
tolerated.”
Yngve cites Erving Goffman’s from his essay on Face Work:
The conventions regarding the structure of occasions of talk rep-
resent an effective solution to the problem of organizing a flow of
spoken messages. In attempting to discover how it is that these
conventions are maintained in force as guides to action, one finds
evidence to suggest a functional relationship between the struc-
ture of the self and the structure of spoken interaction. (Erving
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Goffman: On face work: an analysis of ritual elements in social
interaction.” cited from Yngve (1970), p.571)
And that is exactly what Yngve says to be interested in: “the functional
relationship between the structure of the self and the structure of spoken
interaction”. What remains to be done is “to produce a structural description
of the state of mind” (based on the structure of self of Goffman) and “show
explicitly how it is related to communicative behavior in its totality, including
the linguistic details.” (Yngve, p.571)
Since Yngve’s sketch of a new linguistic framework in 1970, a huge pile
of reports on research in turn taking and floor have seen the light. Dun-
can (1972a) claims that there is a regular communication mechanism in our
culture for managing the taking of speaking turns in face-to-face interaction.
Through this mechanism, participants in an interaction can effect the smooth
and appropriate exchange of speaking turns.
2.2. The SSJ model of turn taking
A frequently cited paper on turn-taking is the SSJ paper Sacks et al.
(1974) in which the authors present their “simplest systematics for turn tak-
ing”. We discuss this model, as it referenced in virtually all turn-taking
literature. Authors either implement it (Kronlid (2006), Bohus and Horvitz
(2010)) or they explicitly depart from this model (Thorisson (2002)).
SSJ starts with a thorough observation of the dynamics of a conversation.
Their “grossly apparent facts [of] any conversation” are very astute (pp. 700-
701):
1 Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs.
2 Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
3 Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief.
4 Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no overlap are
common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight
overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions.
5 Turn order is not fixed, but varies.
6 Turn size is not fixed, but varies.
7 Length of conversation is not specified in advance.
8 What parties say is not specified in advance.
9 Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance.
10 Number of parties can vary.
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11 Talk can be continuous or discontinuous.
12 Turn allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker may
select a next speaker (as when he addresses a question to another
party); or parties may self-select in starting to talk.
13 Various ‘turn constructional units’ are employed; e.g., turns can be
projectedly ’one word long’, or they can be sentential in length.
14 Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors and viola-
tions; e.g., if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one
of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble.
In the SSJ turn-taking model, rules are defined with the main goal to
achieve smooth and (close to) “one-at-a-time” speaker exchanges. In ad-
dition to the rules, there are two components necessary for the rules to
work on: turn-constructional and turn-allocation components. The turn-
constructional component describes what a turn can consist of. This en-
tails ‘various unit-types with which a speaker may set out to construct a
turn.’ These ‘allow a projection of the unit-type under way’. “The speaker
is initially entitled, in having a turn, to one such unit. The first possi-
ble completion of a first such unit constitutes an initial transition relevance
place.”(p.703). The turn-allocation component concerns the selection of the
next speaker, either by self selection of by current speaker allocation. The
rules are defined as follows (p.704):
1 For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial turn-
constructional unit:
(a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a ’cur-
rent speaker selects next’ technique, then the party so selected has
the right and is obliged to take next turn to speak; no others have
such rights or obligations, and transfer occurs at that place.
(b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use or
a ’current speaker selects next’ technique, then self-selection for
next speakership may, but need not, be instituted; first starter
acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs at that place.
(c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use of a
’current speaker selects next’ technique, then current speaker may,
but need not continue, unless another self-selects.
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2 If, at the initial transition relevance place of an initial turn-constructional
unit, neither 1a nor 1b has operated, and, following the provision of 1c,
current speaker has continued, then the rule set a-c re-applies at the
next transition-relevance place, until transfer is effected.
Turn taking is a “locally managed” process: it only depends on the current
conversational situation, who has what conversational role, who is talking,
and who is being addressed by the speaker. There is no global process that
manages the conversation. Managing a conversation locally can be done in
a number of ways, including, by looking at that person, or by asking that
person a question Lerner (2003).
Besides common conversations there are other “speech-exchange systems”
possible, such as, interviews, debates, ceremonies and meetings, trials, etc.
These types can differ from conversation on a range of turn-taking param-
eters. For example, in meetings with a chair-person, turns are partially
pre-allocated, and unallocated turns can be assigned via the use of the pre-
allocated turns. In other words, the chair-person has the right to talk first,
to talk after each other speaker, and they can use each turn to allocate next
speakership Sacks et al. (1974),p.729. Analysis of a corpus of design meetings
supports this model of a multi-layered floor structure. The floor position of
the contribution is an important parameter to take into account for assess-
ment of the social emotional value, for example politeness or dominance, of
this contribution (Akker et al. (2010)).
2.3. Critiques of the turn taking model
Comments on the SSJ model of turn taking comes from various angles.
In this subsection we discuss the main comments.
2.3.1. Comments on the structuralist approach
O’Connell et al. (1990) presents “a radical critique of the assumptions,
concepts, methods, statistics and interpretation of data, and theories that
have characterized the recent research tradition concerned with turn-taking”.
Their main target is the “simplest systematics” of Sacks, Schegloff, and Jef-
ferson (1974). O’Connell et al. (1990) state:
Instead of investigating in their own right the variables relevant
to turn-taking, such as politeness and cultural norms, probabilis-
tic speaker and hearer cues, expectations, motivations, purposes,
and situational exigencies, the turn-taking research tradition has
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introduced a confusing array of purely formalistic terms such as
signals, rules, devices, procedures, and systems under the general
aegis of the ’turn-taking procedure’.
Where Sacks et al. (1974) claim that ”the existence of organized turn-
taking is something that the data of conversation have made increasingly
plain” (p.699), Cowley (1998) argues that “for methodological reasons, Sacks
et al. presupposed that conversations are sequences of turns” and that there
is no evidence that such a mechanism as a turn-taking device exists.
We believe that the difference between Sacks et al. (1974) and critics as
Cowley (1998) and O’Connell et al. (1990) is that where the former try to
come up with a model that tries to describe the conversational outcomes
as they are produced by the interactants, (the sentences, phrases, the turns
in the sequential order in which they have been produced), the latter are
more interested in the utterances, the gestures, the micro physics of the
subtle signals and processes that “underly” the dialogical behavior. There
are difference in the way the rules are interpreted: as descriptive, describing
the “normal” way social agents behave, or as normative or even as rules that
agents follows as if they were computer programs. Below we will come back
on the status of the “one-at-a-time-rule”.
2.3.2. Clark and Allwood’s comments on the notion of “turn”
There are concerns with the validity of the construct turn, and more in
general with the adequacy of the definition of the basic terms Sacks et al.
(1974) use in describing their system. Clark (1996) points at the fact that
the notions of turn and transition relevant place ask for a more fundamental
explanation since they are defined in a circular way. In his popular book
“Using Language”, Herbert Clark presents his account of turn taking in
conversations within his general theory of joint activity. “The placement of
speech and other actions in conversation really emerges from the way people
try to advance joint activities.” (Clark (1996), p.327.) Clark sees SSJ’s rules
explained by his multilevel theory of joint actions.
The participants in a joint activity work hard to get closure at
all levels of talk - execution and attention, presentation and iden-
tification, meaning and understanding, projection and uptake.
What emerges is a set of procedures that determine who speaks
and acts when. These in turn account for Sacks et al.’s turn-
allocation rules. Further, participants contribute to discourse in
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two phases - a presentation phase and an acceptance phase. This
process determines Sacks et al.’s turn-constructional units. The
two phases of contributing account for who speaks when in ways
that go beyond the turn-allocation rules (adapted from Clark
(1996), p.328-329.)
Clark’s theory provides an explanation of turn-taking as an emergent
phenomenon. He states that “There is no evidence that people try to preserve
turns per se.” (p.329). This means that turn taking rules might not be as
fixed and clean as the model by Sacks et al. (1974) seems to imply.
In addition to Clarks joint action model, Jens Allwood proposes the no-
tion of contribution. He suggests to analyze the different statuses that a
contribution has in the context of a collaborative activity (Allwood (2000)):
The concept of “turn” as originally put forth in Sacks, Sche-
gloff and Jefferson (1974) can be said to be a combination of
the notions of “utterance”, “sentence” and “speech act” with the
notions of “right to speak”, “holding the floor” and “having an
audience”. In some cases, these notions coincide, in others they
don’t, which, for example, leads to difficulties in deciding whether
a given contribution is a turn or not. Rather than leaving the
interpretation of what a turn is open in this way, it would be
preferable to connect speaker contributions analytically with a
bundle of features constituted by the above mentioned concepts
and admit that all of them do not always coincide.
This means that, according to Allwood (2000), a turn is a derived concept.
The more basic concepts in his theory are activity and contribution.
2.3.3. Is “turn” culturally biased?
Several authors have pointed at cultural differences in turn-taking behav-
ior. Berry (1994) found that Spanish and American people have different
interpretations of the other’s turn-taking behaviors which leads to misunder-
standing of each others stance towards the other. Kilpatrick (1986) reports
that his Puerto Rican students had the opinion that there is no such rule as
Schegloff’s “one party at a time” for English conversation. They felt that in
Puerto Rican conversations “everyone talks at once”. An analysis of recorded
conversations among Puerto Rican students revealed that 90% of the speech
was indeed simultaneous. This makes the definition of turn as the speech of
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one speaker separated by the speech of another9 not very usefull. Kilpatrick
sees turn as “a recognized speech utterance” a definition that was suggested
to him by Dale Russel. “Recognized” means recognized by a hearer. You
may say that a contribution is only a contribution if both parties (sender and
receiver) see it that way. In fact this is not that far from Schegloff’s idea of
turn as an “interactive achievement”.
The one-at-a-time rule is often seen as a rule of good conduct and of
polite behavior. The contrast in conversational cultures makes it difficult to
relate simultaneous speech to politeness or impoliteness. Puerto Rican stu-
dents associated simultaneous speech with politeness, not with being rude. It
seems that “turn” as conceptualized in linguistic and computational Ameri-
can/European research circles has a cultural bias.
Where the anthropological literature reports significant cultural differ-
ences in the timing of turn-taking in ordinary conversation (substantial over-
lap and a preference for simultaneous speech -see e.g. Wieland (1991)- or long
pauses in between turns), recent research that test these claims shows that
there are striking universals. At least, in the underlying pattern of response
latency in natural conversation. Stivers et al. (2009) looked at the situations
where a yes-no question was asked followed by an answer. Response time
was defined as the time elapsed between the end of the question turn and the
beginning of the response turn. Using a worldwide sample of 10 languages
drawn from traditional indigenous communities to major world languages,
Stivers et al. show that all of the languages tested provide clear evidence for
a general avoidance of overlapping talk and a minimization of silence between
conversational turns in these situations. They do find differences across the
languages in the average gap between the turns, within a range of 250 ms
from the cross-language mean. They suggest that a natural sensitivity to
these tempo differences leads to a subjective perception of dramatic or even
fundamental differences as offered in ethnographic reports of conversational
style. There is more in conversations than question answer pairs however
and the question remains: are there culturally variable turn-taking systems?
Moreover, in question answering we typically have a situation where the ad-
dressee has a task (to answer) that requires the fulfillment of the questioner’s
9The proposed ISO definition of turn is a stretch of communicative activity produced by
one participant who occupies the speaker role, bounded by periods where another participant
occupies the speaker role. (ISO/DIS 24617-2(E))
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task, to state the question.
In American and Western sociolinguistic studies in the 70s and 80s gen-
der differences in conversations were a hot topic. It appeared that females
were more interrupted by males than vice versa. Sometimes this is seen
as a sign of dominance of the male partner over the female (Beattie et al.
(1982)). Some authors report that female conversations show more simulta-
neous speech than male conversations (see for example Edelsky (1981)). On
the other hand, based on an analysis of a subset of Dutch telephone conversa-
tion, Louis ten Bosch (2005) reports that male-male dialogues show a higher
proportion of overlapping turns than female-female dialogues. Other factors
that may influence conversational turn-taking behavior are personality and
status differences between interlocutors (Beattie (1981)).
There is hardly any agreement on what cultural parameters should be
included in models for artificial conversational agents in order that they can
show culturally colored behavior. Also there seems to be no agreement con-
cerning gender differences in conversational behavior.
2.3.4. Thorisson et al.’s position
Thorisson (2002) argues that what misses in the SSJ model is how conver-
sational partners recognize the turn constructional units. We have seen that
Duncan (1972b) proposed the existence of “cues” for turn signalling. “Such
cues are generated by interlocutors for the purpose of “signaling” to each
other the state of the dialogue, such as whether they want the other to take
the turn, whether they want to keep the turn, etc.” Thorisson et al. claims
that Duncans cues are simply the features missing from the SSJ model: the
features that are used to identify the turn-constructional units, and their
boundaries. Another comment from Thorisson et al. is that the SSJ model
does not take into account “the internal state of cognitive processing of the
participants”. This “internal state” (this is the “state of mind” that Yngve
proposed to model, see section 2) clearly also affects the way participants in
a conversation respond to the cues in the dialogue. This “state of mind” of
the conversational agent will be a core module in the architecture for natural
interacting conversational agents.
2.3.5. Emotions and turn-taking
Emotions are one of the kinds of “underlying mechanisms” that play in
conversations and that affect, for example, if a listener takes turn. Heylen
et al. (2011b) argued that taking a more individualistic view on turn taking
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-in contrast to a more conversational view from which the SSJ model is
formulated- might yield interesting insights. “An agent decides to speak
when the reasons for speaking outweigh the reasons for not speaking and
vice versa, an agent decides not to speak when the reasons for not speaking
outweigh the reasons for speaking.” (p.329). What are these reasons for
(not) speaking? And, how do emotions influences the cognitive deliberation
between the various reasons? Moreover, also intentions and motives are
triggered and modulated by emotions. For example, when someone offended
you, you might decide not to speak with the offender anymore. Or if you are
engaged in an enthusiastic conversation, you might recurrently interrupt the
other speaker in your enthusiasm.
2.3.6. Conclusion
The impressive body of work by Sacks et al. (1974) and other conversation
analysts that worked on the turn-taking theory, gives a detailed description
of things that can occur in a conversation. These observations are, in our
opinion, falsely made into rules that govern conversation. To try and describe
the dynamics of a conversation in ’simple systematics’ is brave and impres-
sive, but has a flaw. Such simple systematics cannot describe the wide array
of possible conversation types (e.g. ranging from small talk among siblings
to a formal ritual like a marriage ceremony). To describe this wide array of
different conversations in simple rules means that, either the rules are very
general (e.g. in a conversation speakers alternate), or they are very detailed
and only apply to some types of conversation (e.g. there is no overlap between
speakers). For this last example, it seems clear that it does not hold for small
talk among siblings, it does however, hold true for a strict ritual such as a
marriage ceremony. Therefore, we suggest that observations of conversations
by conversational analysts (as e.g. Sacks et al. (1974)) remain what they
are, observations of conversations as they are produced. They are invaluable
in naming the things that occur in conversation. In our opinion, we should
work towards a model that lets the conversational dynamics emerge from
an underlying system. This system should be able to produce the observed
conversational behavior, but it should do so without having to represent the
simplest systematic rules explicitly as a program for the agent to follow. This
seems the only viable way to have a system that is sufficiently dynamic to
represent all the various forms of conversation that exist. Also, it is the only
way to prevent ending up in a race to include all the possible conversational
exceptions that are possible, including those that are not yet described. The
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question now is, what might an underlying system for conversation (and turn
taking) look like?
Turn taking seems to be constitutive for any multi-party collaborative ac-
tivity, including conversation or dialogue: without it there is no conversation.
The very concept of having a dialogue implies in a logical sense that those
who participate in it at least have the intention to give the other space to
talk to pay respect to his words. This seems to be consistent with Schegloff’s
view when he says:
“To take one-at-a-time” to be a basic design feature in partici-
pants’ co-construction of talk-in-interaction is not to assert that
it is invariable achieved. If some design feature of ANY project,
pursued through an organization of practices, fails to be achieved
on some occasion (or even on many occasions), this is not prima
facie evidence that it is not a design feature to which participants
orient in the course of its production.” Schegloff (2000).
The very fact that perceptually speakers speak sometimes “out of turn”
presupposes a working notion of turn, as a space in time where the attention
is at one of the partners. It refers to turn taking rules that serve a practical
and fair distribution of the available space and time. In debates participants
repeatedly remind each other of these social rules of good conduct, for exam-
ple by saying “may I finish my turn please”, or the like. What is also clear is
that not all overlapping talk is problematic. But sometimes speakers talking
at the same time apply some repair mechanism (Schegloff, 2000). One of
the capabilities a conversational agent must have is to detect the different
causes and emotional values of overlapping talk and to respond to this in a
reasonable or emotional way that fits his character and the situation. We
will come to the emotional capabilities of conversational turn taking agent
when we discuss emotions and architectures for these type of agents.
3. Architectures for natural interaction
Dialogue systems either completely control when the user can perform
what types of actions, or they give the user more freedom. In the former case
the synchronisation of system and user actions is already established before
the interaction starts. The user has to know the interaction protocol and it is
explicitly signalled who has the turn and what actions can be performed by
23
the user. In the latter case the system is essentially a-synchronous: while the
system acts, the user acts. Thus synchronisation between user and system
has to be established dynamically (it needs to be “locally managed”). This
has to be learned.
Most dialogue systems are turn based, i.e. they have some notion of turn
unit and they assume a fixed set of signals or cues that signal turn-taking and
turn yielding. In recent spoken dialogue systems there are separate modules
for topic management and for turn-taking management. The turn-taking
modules of these systems are often based on the SSJ turn-taking model. A
second type of systems is build on the idea of “continuous interaction”. We
will discuss pros and cons of both types of systems. We propose to consider
the agent’s attention dynamics as an underlying mechanism that shows in
the agent’s emergent turn-taking behavior.
3.1. Turn based architectures
The SSJ model Sacks et al. (1974) is the most popular model for turn-
taking referred to by people working in the field of computational dialogue
systems and social agents. Examples are Dan Bohus and Eric Horvitz’ work
on multi-party turn-taking Bohus and Horvitz (2010) and Kronlid (2008).
See also Tho´risson et al. (2010) and Traum’s Mission Rehearsal Exercise
(MRE) system reported in Traum et al. (2008).
Harel’s statecharts (Harel (1987)), the basis for a W3C proposal for
SCXML (State Chart eXtended Markup Language), are used by several
authors to specify turn-taking models. Sometimes they are used for other
modules of dialogue systems as well (see e.g. Heylen et al. (2011a)). Exten-
sions of this formalism were introduced in Kronlid and Lager (2007). Ex-
tended SCXML comes close to the Information State Update specification
languages such as DIPPER (Bos et al. (2003)) and Flipper (ter Maat and
Heylen (2011)). Raux and Eskenazi (2009) presents the turn-taking model of
the Carnegie Mellon University Dialogue System using Harel’s state charts.
Kronlid’s turn manager implements the SSJ system seen as a system (of
“guide lines”) that tells the agents who has the right to speak. Every agent
has his own turn manager and dialog manager. There is an EventModule
that signals a set of relevant events:
• speaker X starts speaking
• speaker X stops speaking
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• speaker X will (probably) stop speaking in D units
• speaker X is addressed, i.e. X has been selected as next speaker by
some other dialog partner
Similar types of events are used by the turn manager of Bohus and Horvitz
(2010). The turn manager emits one of the following events:
• freeTRP: anyone may self-select
• myTRP: I am selected as next speaker
• otherTRP: someone else is selected as next speaker
• noTRP: TRP canceled
• overlap: speech is overlapping
• overlapResolved: speech is no more overlapping
The turn manager has three (parallel) charts. Figure 1 shows the three
part state chart from Kronlid (2006).
The Outside chart deals with the other’s states: are they speaking or
silent? The Inside chart deals with the relation between the agent self and
the other agents. The TRP chart deals with signaling TRPs. The TRP
predictor needed to predict TRPs is assumed to exist but not explained. It
says how many units it lasts until a TRP will arrive. This is the hard part of
the turn manager: how to predict coming TRPs in a reliable way? Prosodic
cues or a list of possible sentences are used for predicting end of turns.
There is discussion in the literature about the role of the state chart for
the agent (see Raux and Eskenazi (2009)). For Kronlid the state chart is used
to restrict the behavior of the agent. When some event occurs and the agent
model is in a state where the event is not permitted then the agent remains
in that state and the event is not “allowed”. This is the original idea of the
state chart, to specify the possible traces of the system. There is however
another interpretation or use of the state chart for agent modeling. In this
alternative view the state are used as states of mind of the agent. They are
not primarily used to restrict the behavior of the agent, for example to say
what can happen or not happen in a given conversational situation, but to
encode the various states so that the agent can act in an appropriate way.
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Figure 1: Three parts of the turn-taking model: Inside, Outside, and TRP chart. (from:
Kronlid (2006))
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This is how we will use the state chart when we use it to model the effect
of emotions on the internal state of the agent. Harel state charts also allows
synchronisation between processes.
Delays caused by internal processing time may cause errors. Consider
the fragment in Fig. 2 taken from a dialogue between a user and the flight
reservation developed at CMU Raux and Eskenazi (2007). Imagine that
utterance (4) was spoken by the user not after (3) but after (2). An asyn-
chronous Dialog Manager (DM) would still, erroneously, interpret it in state
(3), as an answer to the yes/no question. However, given its timing, utter-
ance (4) would better be interpreted as a backchannel response to the implicit
confirmation (2). The second issue with asynchronous DMs is that because
the DM is on hold while waiting for user responses, no execution can occur
until either the user responds or a timeout is triggered. During those wait-
ing phases, the DM cannot handle non-conversational events, which could
have conversational consequences (e.g. the system might need to inform the
user of a change in the real world). To address these issues, we introduce
the concept of conversational floor into the execution module of the DM.
The floor is an additional dialogue state variable that can take three values:
user, system, and free. The value of the floor is not decided by the DM but
acquired from lower level modules. Each action that the DM can plan has
two markers: one indicates the value(s) in which the floor can be for this
action to be executed; the other indicates the value of the floor after the ex-
ecution of the action is completed. Typically, conversational acts require the
floor to be free, with the exception of backchannel conversational acts and
interruptions. Non-conversational actions (e.g. interacting with a backend
database) also do not have floor requirements. In terms of floor transitions,
the general behavior is for the floor to become User after questions and Free
after statements. The DM only executes actions whose floor requirements
are satisfied. When the floor is either User or System, the DM is still able
to accept events, update the dialogue state, perform planning, and execute
non-floor requiring actions. Both floor transitions and dialogue state up-
dates are triggered by events from the Intermediate Layer, i.e. they reflect
changes in the real world precisely when they occur. This allows the DM
to interpret events, including interruptions and backchannels, in the right
context. Through floor and state update events, the execution module of the
DM is thus synchronized with the real-world dialogue. The combination of
an asynchronous planning module with a synchronous execution module is
the essence of a semi-synchronous dialogue manager.
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User: I want to go to Boston. (1) System: Going to Boston. (2)
System: Do you need a return trip? (3) User: Yes. (4)
Figure 2: Extract from a dialogue in the flight reservation domain.(from:Raux and Eske-
nazi (2007))
Figure 3: Two layer model with floor state and interaction manager (from Raux and
Eskenazi (2007))
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Most spoken dialogue systems were build for interacting with one single
human interactant. The selection of the next speaker is an issue in multi-
party interaction. (See Bohus and Horvitz (2010), Bohus and Horvitz (2011),
Traum et al. (2008), Kronlid (2008), Traum and Rickel (2002)).
Tho´risson et al. (2010) describes an extension of the Ymir Turn Taking
Model (YTTM) for multiparty turn-taking, adding to the YTTM existing
functionalities the ability to model multiple speakers engaged in a “polite”
cooperative dialogue. The authors support the view that turn-taking is an
indirect result of the many mechanisms at play in dialogue, in particular their
complex interaction and effects of limitations of realtime cognitive capabili-
ties. “The best way to capture the operation of these many interacting mental
functions in dialogue is to try to model dialogue as a fairly complete cogni-
tive system, at a relatively fine level of detail.” In the multi-party YTTM
each conversation participant has an individual context model, updated with
decisions from its internal deciders and input from its perception modules.
Perceptions include a list of all conversation participants, who is talking,
who is “looking at me” (for any given agent) and who is requesting turn at
each given time. Each participant also has configuration for urge-to-speak ;
probability that another participant wants to talk (based on perceptions of
their actions), the speed at which urge-to-speak rises (modeling a type of
impatience for getting the turn), and the yield tolerance when someone else
wants it (while he has turn). For any given participant, its perception of
the gaze behaviors of others determines in part whether it is possible to take
turn politely. All agents in the experimental set-up were set to be polite and
collaborative. A mechanism that relates an emotional state of the agent to
the variables that influence the turn-taking is not present in the model.
3.2. Architecture for continuous interaction
Many spoken dialogue systems work on a strict turn by turn basis. Build-
ing conversational agents that are able to listen while speaking, and that al-
low, what is sometimes called, “continuous interaction”, is an active research
topic (e.g. Reidsma et al. (2011), and Wang et al. (2011)). The idea of
“continuous interaction” in contrast to turn based interaction, is that there
is no static design time decided unit (temporal or behavioral) of interaction.
On the contrary, in principle a participant can contribute something to the
interaction at any time. It is up to the participants to pick up the relevant
bits and pieces and to react on it. Attentive speaking and active listening
require that a Virtual Human be capable of simultaneous interpretation and
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generation of communicative behavior. Moreover, “a Virtual Human should
be able to signal its attitude and attention while it is listening to its inter-
action partner, and be able to attend to its interaction partner while it is
speaking and modify its communicative behavior on-the-fly based on what
it observes in the behavior of its partner” (Reidsma et al. 2011, p.97).
In order to realize a fluent conversation in which turn-taking is “locally
managed”, some technical challenges arise. First, input from the user should
be processed as soon as it is produced. This is necessary to respond verbally
and non-verbally without delays, since delays disturb the conversational flow.
Clark and Krych (2004) claim that speakers make their adaptations while
producing their utterance almost instantly, typically initiating them within
half a second of the opportunity arising. Second, the system should carefully
synchronize between the various inputs it receives and the speech it gener-
ates. In interaction, and in conversations in particular, temporal order, as
well as pauses, carries meaning. The systems must know the time the ad-
dressee received his words and the time that the addressee started to speak.
Third, the agent should be able to distinguish the sound that comes from
its own text-to-speech system from the sound that comes from the interac-
tant. Incorporating emotions on a reactive level requires a system to solve
these real-time issues. It requires models of social agents that show emotion
in turn-taking and that can cope with emotionally laden overlapping talk,
non-verbal contributions, and pauses by their interlocutors.
In monitoring the attentive state of the conversational partner his gaze
behavior plays a role. First people gaze at something to see that something
because they are interested in it. Gaze and in general focus of attention may
also be a response to others’ gaze behavior. Gaze at other people is a social
act with an emotional value and can be face threatening. People often avoid
mutual gaze because of this emotional value of closeness or intimacy. Many
authors point at the role of gaze in face-to-face conversation (see e.g. Novick
et al. (1996)). People engaged in conversation may look at one another
to monitor listener acceptance and understanding, to signal attention and
interest, and to coordinate turn-taking. Conversely, people look away to
concentrate on complex cognitive tasks. Beattie (1981) found that the role
that gaze plays in turn-taking depends on context. When the overall level of
gaze is low, as in conversations between strangers or when the discussion topic
imposes a high cognitive load on the conversants, gaze plays a more significant
role. Novick et al. (1996) explores the role of gaze in coordinating turn-taking
in mixed-initiative conversation and specifically how gaze indicators might
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be usefully modeled in computational dialogue systems.
3.2.1. Anticipatory attention
The Ymir Turn Taking Model of Thorisson et al. Thorisson (2002) has
three layers, each with their own processes running with different priorities
and frequencies, for generating feedback to perceived signals. The highest
priority layer is the Reactive Layer. It is concerned with behaviors that have
perceive-act cycles shorter than 1 second. Reactive actions, like “looking
away when you believe its your turn to speak” or gazing at objects men-
tioned by the presenter, belong in this Reactive Layer. The second layer
is the Process Control Layer. It includes mental activities like starts and
stops, interrupts; everything that has to do with the process of the dialogue
task. The perceive-act cycle of such events typically lie between a half and
2 seconds (p.183). Together these two layers contain the mechanisms of
dialogue management, as well as psychosocial dialogue skills. The lowest-
priority layer, the Content Layer, is where the “topic” of the conversation is
processed.
The Ymir Turntaking Model (YTTM) has expanded into “a broad compu-
tational model of conversational skills”. However, there is no explicit atten-
tion for the inter-dependencies between turn management and the emotional
state of the agent. This is also true for the later versions (Tho´risson et al.
(2010)). This lack of attention for combined turn-taking and emotion is an
omission.
We have seen that synchronisation between autonomous processes run-
ning in their own time is a key aspect of communication. If some process A
depends on the outcome of some other process B this implies that A should
wait for B. A response can be given only when the request is expressed.
This is the information theoretical rationale behind the turn-taking model.
When B only needs half a word to understand what A will ask him, B can
answer before A has produced the complete question. Various factors deter-
mine if B actually does that. Social relations and cultural habits play a role
here. Synchronisation requires attentiveness or being sensitive or open to-
ward the other. This depends on limited resources. People are not attentive
to everything that happens all the time. It is thus quite natural that a VH
while speaking does not continuously attend the actions and expressions of
its addressees. A natural VH has a limited resource and his behavior will
depend on the available resources. Resource (in particular energy) manage-
ment and attention management are thus necessary parts of a conversational
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agent. One crucial factor that directs or suppresses attention and energy is
emotion.
4. Emotions for virtual humans
If artificial (human-like) companions should be able to display behaviours
and skills similar to human companions they should meet the following six
requirements, often cited in the literature (Heylen et al. (2011a)). Social
robots and agents should be able to:
1. Express and perceive emotions
2. Communicate with high-level dialogue
3. Learn and recognize models of other agents
4. Use natural cues (gaze, gestures, etc.)
5. Exhibit distinctive personality and character
6. Learn and develop social competencies
Emotions influence al other qualities of the companion. Computational
models of emotion consider emotions in relation to cognition, perception and
expression. These models need to provide answers to the following questions.
• How do we recognize others emotions and one’s own emotions?
• How to generate emotionally colored behaviors and expressions?
• How to represent emotional state in technical systems?
• What is the relation between emotion and perception and cognition.
• What is the role of emotion in the selection of behavior?
• How does emotion influence attention?
The impression we have from the literature is that what authors call
emotion is not always the same.
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4.1. What do we mean by emotion?
There are a lot of different ways to define emotions. Maybe that is because
there are so many different emotions and that people who study emotions
focus on one of the issues above. If we say that someone is “overwhelmed by
emotion”, the word emotion refers to some state of mind of a person who was
impressed by some situation, something that happened, it may be a thought
that caught him. Emotion is an internal force of living beings that makes
them move similar to motivation, but without the cognitive and reasonable
connotation that motivations have. Frijda (1986) calls them “action tenden-
cies”. Inhibitions may prevent that we immediately follow these dispositions.
Emotions come and go in many different guises and flavors. Sometimes emo-
tions are seen as irrational, which has a negative connotation, but we also
understand the function they have in our live. Cowie et al. (2011) in the
collection Petta et al. (2011) gives a recent overview of the uses of the word
emotion. The website of EmotionML is an entry for a lot of lists of emotion
terms.10
Social emotions play in human social acting, acting that is directed to oth-
ers and directed by others. The display of emotions is a social act. Marinetti
et al. (2011) is about emotions in social interaction.
4.2. Do ECAs need emotions?
Can ECAs have emotions? What do we mean by “emotion” if we as-
sign emotions to technical systems? Becker et al. (2007) presents motives for
the integration of emotions as integral parts of an agents cognitive architec-
ture. They distinguishes between “primary” and “secondary” emotions as
originating from different levels of their architecture. Primary emotions are
elicited as an immediate response to a stimulus, whereas secondary emotions
are the product of cognitive processing. Primary emotions are understood as
ontogenetically earlier types of emotions and they lead to basic behavioral
response tendencies, which are closely related to “flight-or-fight” behaviors.
In contrast, secondary emotions like “relief” or “hope” involve higher level
cognitive processing based on memory and the ability to evaluate preferences
over outcomes and expectations.
10A Working Draft of ”Emotion Markup Language 1.0”, published on 7 April 2011 can
be found at www.w3.org/TR/emotionml/
33
Sloman et al. (2003) argues that emotions emerge from complex system
behavior. They are the result of many interacting forces. They cannot be
added to a system by incorporating an “emotion module”.
4.3. Emotions in conversations?
What kind of emotions do we see in conversations that show in turn tak-
ing behavior? This turns out to be a hard question. There have been per-
ception studies after the impression that turn-taking style makes on human
observers. One of the first studies that addresses turn-taking and emotional
feedback, produced by an embodied conversational agent, is reported in Cas-
sell and Tho´risson (1999). This perception study concerns the importance
of two types of feedback: envelop feedback and emotional feedback, for the
effectiveness of an “interactive computer character” when added to content
feedback, such as answering a question or responding to a request. Emotional
feedback is, for example, shown by scrunched eyebrows to indicate puzzle-
ment, or a smile and raised eyebrows to indicate happiness. Envelop feedback
are verbal and non-verbal backchannels and gaze behaviors produced by the
agent in response to the user’s communicative actions. They are related to
the conversational process. A user perception study confirms the authors
hypothesis that, for effectiveness of the communication, envelop feedback in
combination with content feedback is more important than emotional feed-
back in combination with content feedback. Effectiveness is measured by the
relative number of user contributions, hesitations and overlaps. Cassell and
Tho´risson (1999) argue that the smoother conversation is a result of users
being able to apply human-human conversational knowledge to the interac-
tion and keep track of the process of the conversation. Cassell and Tho´risson
(1999) used, an early version of, the Ymir model for their agent.
Humans assign different personality traits to ECAs that follow different
turn-taking regimes, as was shown by ter Maat (2011). He describes four
ECAs that have the goal of trying to keep the user talking. The ECAs have
different personalities (sad, happy, aggressive, and pragmatic) and try to get
the user in their state. For turn taking this meant that the aggressive ECA
took the turn aggressively, i.e., quickly after a pause onset and often even
interrupting the user. The happy ECA took the turn in a similar manner,
quickly after the user stopped speaking. The sad ECA waited a moment
before it started speaking. User perception was investigated for the differ-
ent turn taking strategies. Quick turn taking and interrupting ECAs were
perceived as more negative, and were thought to have a strong assertive
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personality. ECAs taking the turn after a pause were perceived as more
agreeable, less assertive and users developed more rapport with them. We
feel it is important to remark that there is a wide array of research on the
perception of turn taking, see for example: Goldberg (1990) and Robinson
and Reis (1989).
It should be noted, that in the experiments by ter Maat (2011) and ter
Maat and Heylen (2009), the agents turn-taking behavior is not controlled by
a dynamic model of the agents affective state itself. The model behind their
agent is fairly superficial. In order to build virtual humans that behave in a
believable way, we also need to model the emotional and social mechanisms
behind the behaviors from which turn-taking emerges. Turn taking behavior
should be the result of the autonomous actions of interacting agents.
5. Computational models of emotion
Humans have emotional capabilities. They can experience emotions, they
can express emotions, they can act in a certain way in response to their
emotional experiences in certain circumstances. Humans can also assign an
emotional state to other humans. Humans do involuntarily express emotions
they experience, but they sometimes display emotions voluntarily to commu-
nicate their emotional experience to others. Emotions are intentional in the
sense that they have an object, which is not the same as their cause. Some-
times the object of the emotions is rather specific and can be determined
and known, sometimes it is rather vague. Moods are emotional states that
often have less clear and specific objects. There is a relation between the
object and the emotion. For example, you can only be afraid of something
that is frightening for you, the object has something frightening. Emotional
capabilities are to be distinguished from character traits. Someone who is
capable of experience fear need not be a timorous sort of person (see Goldie
(2000)). Character traits are dispositions for having thought and feelings
of a certain sort. A friendly and social open character will more easily feel
happy in a social conversation than an introvert character. Emotions influ-
ence the way we perceive what is going on in a certain situation as well as the
way we cope with the situation. Some theories distinguish a small number
of emotions as basic emotions. The involuntary immediate bodily expres-
sion in facial expressions of these emotions is often considered pan-cultural.
This holds also for the recognition of the emotions by experiencing the facial
expressions displayed by someone enacting the emotion.
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In this section we discuss some of the prevailing computational models
of emotion. The role these models have for the researcher depends on his
particular interest and his research area. Computational models of dialog
as well as computational models of emotions are developed in the field of
social psychology and social linguistics. They are used then as theoretical
constructs to improve understanding of the subject matter of these science.
According to Marsella et al.(2009) the advantage is that computational mod-
els enforces to lay out the theoretical concepts in more detail. Emotion (as
well as dialog) models are also developed and used in the field of human
computer interaction. Here, computational models of emotion are used for
understanding the emotion of the user related to the interaction with a tech-
nical system, so the system can better adjust its behavior to the user, (Picard
(2003)). Third, computational models are developed in the field of artificial
intelligence, for example to build robots or embodied agents. The idea is
that taking emotions into account makes systems more intelligent. Systems
that have emotions are taken to be better of in some situations than sys-
tems that don’t have emotions. A fourth interest in computational modeling
of emotions is in the field of logic and philosophy. Here the research not
only aims at understanding emotion but also asks how in different disciplines
emotions are understood. Philosophy asks what emotions are and what so-
cial emotions are, whereas in computational emotion psychology emotion is
a basic concept. We will not delve into a detailed discussion about the con-
cept of emotion here, but note that affect and cognition are often seen as
complementary notions, whereas affect is an essential aspect of the cognitive
relation we have to other objects and people. This shows most clearly in
the fact that we want to know everything about the ones we feel affectively
attracted to. Involvement is a cognitive as well as an affective parameter.
It goes without saying that the content of a computational model of
emotion depends on the role it plays for the researcher. For example, an
emotion model for a virtual character that plays a role in a virtual story or
game should be such that the agent behaves in a believable way.
Here we are interested in computational models of emotion that con-
tribute to the fabrication of agents that show natural conversational behav-
ior. This conversational behavior will often be part of other activities that
the agent takes part in, mostly in joint operation with other agents, artificial
or human. Applications are tutoring systems or (interactive) story telling
systems. The emotions that play in a social interaction are part of the “what
is going on” in that activity. Important parameters are among others: social
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distance and familiarity, power and dominance, and how serious the situation
is. These parameters “color” the social interaction. Conversations have dif-
ferent colors or moods depending on these parameters. An interrogation of a
crime suspect by a police officer has a different mood than a chat between a
couple of close friends. Questions that the psychologist asks to a client in a
psycho-analytical session are different in flavor than the standard questions
that an interviewer asks to someone he doesn’t even know. These differences
have to do with the different ways that the people are involved, how impor-
tant the event is for them, what their goals are, what the risks involved are,
how they experience the (conversational) joint activity. What is important
for the participant is how they see “the other”, how they think “the other”
sees him, and how he wants that “the other” sees him. Here “the other” can
be many different concrete others, actually present as a concrete individual
our subject is interacting with, or some vague image of “the other”, a social
conscience. In a political debate broadcasted on television the debaters show
their awareness of the audience. The politician will try to show the public
that he can counter the arguments put forward by his competitors. He will
fight for the floor in order to gain enough space to sell his political story. But
he also shows that he is willing to listen to the other and that he respects
the other even if he doesn’t agree with his political view.
This brings us to the important notion of face and the relation it has with
social emotions. What kind of emotions play a role in social interactions and
how are these emotions related to face? Face and facework are often seen
as the main ingredients of politeness and politeness strategies. ( Brown and
Levinson (1987) and Goffman (1967)). Interrupting the speaker is often seen
as impolite behavior. Politeness is sometimes seen as “strategic conflict-
avoidance”. The idea is that the basic social role of politeness is in its ability
to function as a way of controlling potential aggression between interactional
parties. What is polite is socially appropriate behavior and what is socially
appropriate depends on the speakers social position in relation to the hearer.
If interrupting a speaker is impolite, why do people interrupt others?
Because there are other emotional forces that play a role. Forces that are
so strong that the resulting force makes the agent act. The subject may,
overwhelmed as he is by his spontaneous act, immediately feel sorry or even
ashamed for it and apologize for his behavior.
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5.1. Cognitive emotion theories
The emotion model proposed by Ortony, Clore and Collins (Ortony et al.
(1990)) has often been the basis for the integration of emotions into cognitive
architectures of embodied characters. It has been suggested that it might
be sufficient to integrate only ten emotion categories, five positive and five
negative ones, into an agents architecture when focusing on believability and
consistency of an agents behavior.
Ortony distinguishes three “emotion response tendencies” by which the
effect of an emotion on the agents cognition can be characterized: facial
display, information-processing and coping. Coping deals with the fact that
humans are able to cope with their own emotions in a problem-focused or
emotion-focused way by trying to change the situational context (problem-
focused) or by trying to reappraise the emotion eliciting situation to manage
their own emotions internally (emotion-focused).
Based on neurophysiological findings, Damasio distinguishes “primary”
and “secondary” emotions. Primary emotions are elicited as an immedi-
ate response to a stimulus, whereas secondary emotions are the product of
cognitive processing. Primary emotions are understood as ontogenetically
earlier types of emotions and they lead to basic behavioral response ten-
dencies, which are closely related to “flight-or-fight” behaviors. In contrast,
secondary emotions like “relief” or “hope” involve higher level cognitive pro-
cessing based on memory and the ability to evaluate preferences over out-
comes and expectations.
5.2. Dimensional emotion theories
Wundt (1922) has claimed that any emotion can be characterized as a
continuous progression in a three-dimensional space of connotative mean-
ing. Several researchers, e.g. Gehm and Scherer (1988), Mehrabian (1995),
have later provided statistical evidence for this assumption. Using principle
component analysis they found that three dimensions are sufficient to repre-
sent the connotative meaning of emotion categories. These dimensions are
commonly labeled Pleasure/Valence (P), representing the overall valence in-
formation, Arousal (A), accounting for the degree of activeness of an emotion,
and Dominance/Power (D), describing the experienced control over the emo-
tion itself or the situational context it originated from. The three-dimensional
abstract space spanned by these dimensions is referred to as PAD-space.
Lang (1980) devised a picture-oriented instrument called the Self-Assessment
Manikin (SAM) to directly assess the pleasure, arousal, and dominance as-
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Figure 4: The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) used to rate the affective dimensions of
valence (top panel), arousal (middle panel), and dominance (bottom panel). From Bradley
and Lang (1994)
sociated in response to an object or event (Bradley and Lang (1994)). See
Figure 4.
5.3. Face and politeness
The face is understood as something that is emotionally invested, and
that can be not only lost, but also maintained or enhanced. Goffman (1967)
defines face as “the positive social value a person effectively claims for him-
self by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. In
addition, it is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social at-
tributes(...)”. The relation between politeness and face was studied in Brown
and Levinson (1987). They state that every individual has two types of face,
positive and negative. They define positive face as the individuals desire
that her/his wants be appreciated in social interaction, and negative face as
the individuals desire for freedom of action and freedom from imposition.
B&L’s theory assumes that most speech acts, for example requests, offers
and compliments, inherently threaten either the hearers or the speakers face-
wants, and that politeness is involved in redressing those face threatening
acts. On the basis of these assumptions, three main strategies for perform-
ing speech acts are distinguished: positive politeness, negative politeness and
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off-record politeness. Positive politeness aims at supporting or enhancing the
addressee’s positive face, whereas negative politeness aims at softening the
encroachment on the addressee’s freedom of action or freedom from impo-
sition. The third strategy, off-record politeness, means flouting one of the
Gricean maxims (Grice (1975)) on the assumption that the addressee is able
to infer the intended meaning. Speakers calculate the weight of their speech
acts from three social variables: the perceived social distance between the
hearer and the speaker, the perceived power difference between them, and
the cultural ranking of the speech act. The latter is defined as the degree to
which the face threatening act is perceived to be threatening within a specific
culture. On the basis of the outcome of the calculation, speakers choose the
appropriate type of strategy and substrategy to be employed. Next, they
select the appropriate linguistic means by which to accomplish the chosen
substrategy. Different linguistic structures realize specific strategic choices.
For example, one of the substrategies addressed to the hearers negative face
is Be conventionally indirect, and when the speaker selects this strategy for
asking to pass the salt, s/he may choose the structure Could you pass the
salt?” (See also Vilkki (2006) where B&L’s equation of politeness theory and
face theory is questioned.)
5.4. The EMA model of emotion
Marsella and Gratch (2009) present a computational model of emotion.
They argue that the often used multi-level theories for appraisal complicate
appraisal processes by conflating appraisal and inference. They argue that
appraisal and inference are distinct processes that work on the same mental
representation a person has over their relationship with and in the environ-
ment. They view process validity a key criterion for evaluating a model
of emotion. Process validity, for them, means that the model captures the
unfolding dynamics of emotions. To test this, the model’s behavior and emo-
tion are compared to human data for a situation where emotions occurred.
A surprise/startling event (i.e. a bird flew against a window) yielded the
following sequence of reactions across participants: raised eyebrows, lowered
eyebrows and jaw drop, expressions suggesting relief, amusement, and com-
passion. Such behaviors suggest a transition of emotions from surprise, to
concern for own safety, to concern for others, in response to an unexpected
event. This example shows that emotions are dynamic rather than fixed.
Perceptual and inferential processes alter the interpretation of the situation.
These processes require time to draw inferences, and over time more informa-
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tion can become available or the situation can change. This all contributes to
the dynamics of emotions. In other words, the emotion evolves as cognitive
processes update the person-environment relationship. Authors summarize
the requirements for a computational model of emotion as a process that can
interpret the person-environment (or in this case, the agent-environment) re-
lation. This interpretation of the system is characterized as a set of criteria,
and specific emotions are associated with certain configurations of these cri-
teria. Additionally, appraisal theories that underlie the EMA system posit
specific appraisal dimensions that impose additional requirements (i.e., rel-
evance, valence and intensity, future implications, blame and responsibility,
power and coping potential, and coping strategies). Finally, there are specific
process assumptions that Marsella and Gratch found necessary for concretiz-
ing appraisal theory into a computational model. The notion that appraisal
causes emotion is rooted in the notion by Frijda (1988) as the law of situated
meaning. To address the dynamics of emotional processes, EMA assumes
a cycle of appraisal and re-appraisal. This means that an initial appraisal
of a situation evokes cognitive and/or behavioral responses, which change
the person-environment relation resulting in a cyclical relation between ap-
praisal, coping and re-appraisal. Finally, Marsella and Gratch argue that
there should be a clear distinction between inference and appraisal. They
state that appraisal is a quick and shallow process that forms emotions.
This occurs in parallel to multiple processes, both perceptual and cognitive,
that make inferences about the person-environment relation. See figure 5.
In EMA, a blackboard-style model keeps track of the representation of the
ongoing (causal) interpretation of the agent-environment relations. Knowl-
edge in this representation is explicitly organized in past, current, and future
events, whereby events are organized in a causal manner. Every event rep-
resentation has a probability and a belief component (whether or not the
agent beliefs this event/action is true). For actions, there is also a property
of who did it, and whether or not it was intentional. This is important for
things like assigning blame. Finally, there is a property that assigns the
preference agents have for states. Appraisal, in EMA, is modeled as a set of
continuously active feature detectors that map features of the causal inter-
pretation into appraisal variables. All the objects in the causal interpretation
of the agent-environment are appraised separately, simultaneously and au-
tomatically. The model uses several appraisal values associated with each
object: relevance, perspective, desirability, likelihood, expectedness, causal
attribution, controllability, and changeability.
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Figure 5: From Marsella and Gratch (2009)
Figure 6: From Marsella and Gratch (2009)
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Figure 7: From Marsella and Gratch (2009)
Emotional responses are generated by linking specific appraisal states to
certain emotions, see for example table in Figure 7. In EMA, these emotional
labels are used as a convenient shortcut to generate emotional responses
on an agent (e.g. facial expressions). In the EMA model, see Figure 6,
appraisal is separate from, but closely coupled to, the perceptual, cognitive
and behavioral processes. Emotion, the appraisal frame and affective states,
has a central role in the model. The authors state, this is in keeping with the
view of emotion as an interrupt mechanism. According to this view presented
in the sixties by Herbert Simon emotion is an interruption mechanism that
allows a system to respond in real time to urgent needs (see Simon (1967)).
6. Architectures for an emotional agent
We have seen that there are many different types of emotions, differ-
ent computational models of emotions. There are different motivations for
building emotional systems. As a consequence there are different architec-
tures for modelling emotional agents. Here we discuss two typical models. In
most systems emotion modeling is inspired by the OCC model developed by
Ortony, Clore, and Collins (Ortony et al. (1990)). Approaches differ in the
granularity of modeling, the mathematical machinery for computing emo-
tions, and in the way of how the model has been implemented on a technical
level.
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6.1. An action selection and appraisal architecture for emotional agents
Burghouts et al. (2003) presents an architecture for an emotional agent
that can be used as human computer interface. The underlying model relates
emotion with cognition and behavior. The functional theory of emotions of
Frijda (1986) forms the main theoretical background for the construction
of the model and architecture. According this theory emotion is change in
action readiness or action tendency. Figure 8 shows the architecture that
models the emotion process, cognition and behavior. The boxes to the left
under the label Individual list various characteristics of an individual (agent)
that play a role in the emotion process, such as character and personality.
The emotion process is defined by four modules that each change the
intensity of the emotions in a rule-based fashion: appraisal, activation, inhi-
bition and self-control.
Appraisal The agent continually evaluates its environment. During this
appraisal process emotions are elicited. This proces is based on the
OCC model. Emotions are triggered or elicited depending on certain
conditions and decay over time.
Activation In the activation stage, the emotional state is transformed to
“potency values” for activated emotions, depending on habituation,
expectancy and discrepancy.
Inhibition Suppression of emotions may occur due to inhibition. Inhibition
is especially evident in the case of negative emotions. An individual will
then try to reduce these emotions by emphasizing positive emotions.
Self-control Emotions differ with respect to the ease with which they can be
controlled. It is often claimed that some hot or old emotions, such as
fear, are difficult to control. Self-control is manifested in the reduction
or removal of dissonances between expected behavior (based on the
individuals character) and the standards one upholds (i.e. the way the
agent judges the praiseworthiness of actions).
Various factors play a role in the selection of an action. For instance, how
one perceives the success of behavior depends heavily on ones confidence as
well as on the level of extraversion. The action selection components are rule
based and determine a strategy to actually select an action.
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Figure 8: An action selection and appraisal architecture (from: Burghouts et al. (2003))
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The architecture was tested in a prototype environment with different
characters food. It has food and predators. This was set up to see how the
components in the architecture could be made operational for certain agents
and how this would influence the behavior of these agents living in the envi-
ronment. Hero and Grumph are inhabitants with two different personalities.
They differ in the way they appraise events. Hero is fairly optimistic. He is
more confident and will for instance be more inclined to attack predators. He
is also self-centered, extraverted and idealistic. Grumph is inclined to blame
others for his misfortunes. He is easily disappointed, reproaches others more
often and is introverted. The question asked in Burghouts et al. (2003) is
then if “we can consider our agents behavior to be believable?” The main
achievement is that the architectures generated shallow emotional behav-
ior is believable from observation. “The apparent differences between Heros
and Grumphs behavior relate to our intuition of an idealistic, extraverted,
self-confident but self-centered personality, and an introvert and negative
personality, respectively”.
The architecture covers the complete emotion process. There is how-
ever no interaction between the emotional characters and the human user.
Burghout’s architecture implements a linear emotion process. In the next
subsection we will consider a multi-layered model of emotion processing.
6.2. A multi-layer architecture for emotional agents
Sloman (2001) distinguishes shallow and deeper models of emotion. Within
an architecture-based theory three types of emotions are distinguished: pri-
mary emotions, secondary emotions, and tertiary emotions. The taxonomy
given in Ortony et al. (1990) focuses on a particular set of cognitive and mo-
tivational states and attitudes and can be accommodated within the classes
of secondary and tertiary emotions. The architecture should support the
system to show certain input output behavior which is perceived by humans
as “emotional” of a certain type. So that we can explain the system’s be-
havior as an act partly motivated by some specific emotion (fear, disgust,
envy, shame) that we assign to the state of the machine. According to Slo-
man et al. (2003) “the more human-like robot emotions will emerge from
the interactions of many mechanisms serving different purposes, not from a
particular, dedicated emotion mechanism”.
One of the aspects of the “primary” emotions is the immediate interrupt
effect on the ongoing processing stream. This requires a level of acting that
can immediately interrupt “higher” levels of deliberate behavioral processing.
46
For example, the speaker stops speaking immediately when he suddenly sees
that someone on a short distance throws a tomato at him.11 This is what
LeDoux calls the “pre-cognitive emotion.” LeDoux (1996). They take the
fast (a millisecond) express route from the eye or the ear via the thalamus
to the amygdala which immediately leads to action, before the neocortex
has decided what is going on. (See Dalgleish (2004), p.585 for a review of
neurological experiments that provide evidence for the central role of the
amygdala for the emotion of fear.) According to Adolphs (2004) LeDoux
follows an approach to emotion in the absence of feeling: emotion as behavior
without conscience experience. Sloman has a similar approach to emotion.
In AI Sloman argues it is common to distinguish reactive mechanisms in
which states detected by sensors (whether external or internal) immediately
trigger responses (whether external or internal) from deliberative mechanisms
in which alternative possibilities for action can be considered, categorised,
evaluated, and selected or rejected. Such a deliberative mechanism is capable
of “what if” reasoning. (Sloman (2001), p.11). Notice that in technical
systems this distinction is in the eye of the human designer only. That is,
some actions are seen as reactive response to a sensor input others are seen
as the results of a process of reasoning in which multiple variables determine
the process outcome. But it will be clear that also responses that are seen as
reactive are described by means of “if-then” rules. From the AI perspective
it is easy to forget this: the difference between the meaningful processes of
the computer and the physical processes of the same thing only exist for the
human who understands these processes as state changes and computations.
If emotions are essentially aspects of live, as we think they are, then robots
and ECAs must be seen as living beings in order to assign them an emotional
state.12 Hollnagel (2003) argues that since computers only have one system
11Programming languages, for example Java, support multi-threading and exception
handling. The lower level proces throws an exception that is caught by the monitor of
other processes, and acts as prescribed in an exception handling module.
12From the perspective of AI there is no difference between living systems and technical
systems. They are both conceived as information processing systems. Sloman seems to
have the idea that the essential (relevant) difference between these two types of systems
is in the complexity of their “architectures”. Emotion emerges as a result of interacting
processes in a complex way. Also the difference between internal causes or motives and
external causes disappear from the AI perspective. Discussions within this AI perspec-
tive that try to define various forms of “autonomy” of artificial agents, such as “social
autonomy”, “goal autonomy” and “executive autonomy” are bound to result in circular
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of logical information processing and lack anything similar to an autonomous
nervous system, “there is no way which they can be emotional or affective
in the normal meaning of the words.” “The term affective computing is
therefore an oxymoron.” (p.68).
Figure 9 shows an architecture for a social conversational agent from
Steunebrink et al. (2008). The design shows the three different routes that
emotions follow onto the effects on expression and behavior. These three
routes coincide with the three layers of Sloman’s model.
As an example of a reactive and a cognitive mechanism in a conversa-
tional agent system we can think of two levels of verbal input processing.
A “reactive” proces recognizes occurrences of special key words in the input
that it receives from a keyword recognizer. If a certain key word is recognized
this triggers a standard “emotional response”. A second, more cognitive pro-
cess, recognizes complete utterances based on more in depth sentential and
contextual analysis. This takes more time, but is more precise.
On a third level the system reflects on the lower levels. It perceives
and evaluates the acts and effects that results from the acts caused by the
emotions on the lower level. Here emotions like shame can result if the agent
realizes that it has done something that it feels responsible for, but that he
might not have done if he had full control over his acting. For example,
the agent interrupts a speaker because he feels he should say something
but as soon as he did he feels sorry and apologizes. The system can learn
from experience. For example in our example of shallow versus in depth
language processing the system can adapt the list of key words and associated
responses based on the deeper analysis and the effect of the “emotional”
response.
This requires that the turn-taking system has special states that tell the
agent not only that he speaks but also what motivated or caused him to enter
this state. The meta-level process that reflects on this state can generate
appropriate repair behavior for example face work.
descriptions. “For having goal autonomy an agent must be endowed with goals of its
own.” and “This is the main point: if the agent decides to do something for its own rea-
sons (goals) its decision is autonomous whether it complies with others’ request or not.”
(Castelfranchi and Falcone (2003), both citations p. 108, italics by RodA and MB.) These
kinds of descriptions don’t clarify anything without a clear idea of what it means to do
something “for its own reasons” or “to have goals of its own.”
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Figure 9: A generic architecture for social conversational agents with a layered emotion
model (from: Steunebrink et al. (2008))
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7. Sketch of an architecture for emotional turn taking
In this section, we sketch a multi-layer architecture for a conversational
agent that has the capabilities that we have identified in sections 4 and 5 so
that it incorporates the relations between emotions and turn-taking behavior.
We recall the following capabilities.
1. The agent is able to identify emotional states of its conversational part-
ners. In particular it can recognize those emotions and stances that are
relevant in the given task and context.
2. While listening as well as while talking the agent is able to evaluate
what is being said by the speaker(s) and to assess the emotional and
face value of this.
3. The agent is able to predict the emotional and face value of his own
acts, including what he says as well as what he does with respect to
turn taking.
4. The agent shows emotional awareness on three layers. On the first
layer he is continuously sensitive for low-level inputs which lead to an
immediate response. On the second layer the agent acts emotionally
on an event that attracts his attention. On this layer, contrary to
the previous first layer there is cognitive assessment by some kind of
appraisal mechanism. On the third reflective layer the agent assesses
his own emotional state, mood and behaviors.
Based on our discussion about turn-taking and emotion architectures in
section 3 and section 6 we propose a distributed publish subscribe black-
board architecture with typed message passing between various processors
and modules. Moreover, see our conclusion in section 3 based on our analysis
of the turn based model and the model of continuous interaction, the agent
has an attention module containing the attentive state of the agent. The
attentive state determines how the agent distributes his bounded resources
as attention to the outer and inner events and processes.
The architecture that we propose is a combination of the YMIR layered
architecture for dialogue agents of Thorisson (2002) and the layered emotions
architecture of Sloman (2001). To realize requirements (1) and (2) the archi-
tecture has incremental streaming of “real time” input modules for audio and
video. The speech recognizer and the linguistic and para-linguistic analysers
provide input to cognitive layers with a timing controled by the attentive
state of the agent. To realize requirement (3) the agent has a Social Emotion
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and Face module that assesses the face value of own and others actions. Be-
cause of (4) the proposed architecture has three layers. The main modules
implement the different dimensions that need to be managed for our agent
to interact with other agents which are supposed to be of a similar design.13
Here we elaborate shortly on the turn taking management and the way
turn taking interacts with the emotional layers and the social (face) module.
The state of the turn taking module encodes the notions of turn and floor
as discussed in section 2. The state model has two functions. The first is to
control the possible actions of the agent by means of guarded transitions as in
state machines (Blanch (2006) and Harel (1987)). The second is for reflection:
the agent is aware of the state it is in. Similar as in the turn taking system
of Kronlid (2006) the agent has separate (super)states for his own and the
other agents states. Topic management and turn taking management are
connected as in the architecture of the SERA demonstrator of Heylen et al.
(2011a).
The agent can take turn (in the sense of start talking) either voluntarily,
based on a decision process by the dialogue managers intention planner or
emotionally, based on a response on the second layer. Note that process
outcomes on the first (lowest, automatic) layer will not affect conversational
turn taking content wise. Events processed on this layer may affect the
speech output: the agents stops speaking caused by a direct cause on the
physical level. The turn state models in it state the cause of the turn state.
By the reflective layer the agent can become aware that he took the turn
and interrupted the speaker because of some affective response. The face
module implements the required functions for the face work: the agent may
for example apologize for speaking out of turn.
Given the fact that resources are limited, perceptual processing depends
on the focus of attention of a dialogue system. The dialogue agent antici-
pates expected events by directing his attention on specific input channels or
events. The attention focus depends on the activity the agent is involved in.
In the listening role he will be focusing more on the content of the speaker,
in the speaker role he will be more focusing on the typical types of listener
responses. Global context features such as the general mood of the dia-
13That means that some level of “ritualized” interactive behavior in the community
of interacting agent is assumed to be established when they interact. Note that such a
“common ground” needs to be programmed, so it can be assumed “by design” when we
deal with fabricated agents.
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logue, the task, roles and social relations between participants influence the
expectation the agent is anticipating. This implies that the attention mod-
ules receives input from the turn taking module. Apart from this controlled
mechanism of attention focus anticipating expected events, there is a sec-
ond “mechanism” that has a more random character. Things just happen.
Sometimes they are caught by an attentive listener, sometimes they are not.
That’s life.
8. Conclusion
When we started this review the selection criterium for literature to read
and review was that its focus was on computational models and/or archi-
tectures and/or systems about (social) emotions in relation to turn-taking
in natural conversations. It turned out that there is hardly any literature
that satisfies these criteria. There is a lot about computational models of
emotions, there is a lot about turn-taking models but it appears that VH
nowadays cannot decide about the (social) emotional value of the speech of
the human speaker. Nor can they reason about their own involvement with
the interaction and “decide” if they should interrupt the speaker and how to
express their stance towards what is being said or to the speaker. These are
capabilities that humans have and that we observe in natural conversations.
We decided to review papers in both areas in computational modelling and
systems.
This void in the overlap of the two fields is understandable. Emotion and
conversation belong to two different research areas. But the main reason is
that VHs that can show context-sensitive emotional turn-taking in conversa-
tions need real-time speech and non-verbal input processing. Good quality
real-time speech recognition is the bottleneck even for task-based spoken di-
alogue systems. Moreover, these VHs need complex architectures that allow
multi-processing and synchronisation. This holds for the “internal” processes
for the different layers of activity of the agent itself, but in the first place
for the essentially “autonomous” processes of the participating agents each
of which run in their own time.
For building believable virtual humans that converse with human agents
we need architectures that allow free turn-taking. A number of existing
architectures allow the freedom to take turns whenever the situation asks for
it in the eyes of the agent. Emergent natural emotional conversations implies
free spontaneous turn taking. Computational models of emotion are mostly
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focusing on the basic emotions, hardly on social emotions. In particular face
concerns and politeness issues, which play important roles in conversations,
have not been taken into account in virtual human architectures in relation to
turn-taking. They restrict to how politeness affects the choice of dialogue act
and linguistic style. Simultaneous speech can emerge in conversations either
caused by an emotion process or motivated by a deliberate cognitive process.
Architectures for natural free turn-taking should be extended with modules
that are able to decide what caused the simultaneous speech, that adapt
the emotional state of the agent as well as a module that interacts with the
turn-manager that decides when to talk and that generates an appropriate
response behavior based on the emotional state. Moreover, such an agent
architecture should have different modules each with their own processes for
emotion handling and reflection. We have presented some initial ideas how
the different layers could be modelled using hierarchical state charts.
Well designed architectures are a prerequisite for building model based
embodied conversational agent behavior. But architectures don’t work. Where
humans can simultaneously talk and pay attention to their interlocutor’s ac-
tions, filter the relevant bits and almost immediately react on that, technical
real-time recognizers, such as real-time speech recognition systems, are still a
bottleneck for building conversational agents that show real-time interactive
behavior in which the agent reacts on what the speaker is saying. Building
scripted conversations between virtual humans, similar as in the CrossTalk
system (Rist et al. (2002))14, or the web-based SCREAM system described
in Prendinger and Ishizuka (2002) seems to be a good first step in developing
and evaluating such extended models. They allow us to study how human
observers perceive the mood and emotions that play in an interaction that
is played by virtual humans.
In 1970, Yngve was one of the first who pointed at the main ingredients
of a computational theory of the “state of mind” of the conversational agent.
In his proposal that extends linguistic research to research in conversational
behavior, Yngve makes clear that “turn”, “floor” and emotional stances such
as shown by “enthusiastic and animated agreement” in simultaneous back
channel contributions are essential concepts in such a theory. “What remains
to be done (...) is to produce a structural description of the state of mind and
show explicitly how it is related to communicative behavior in its totality,
14www.dfki.de/crosstalk/
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including the linguistic details.” (Yngve (1970), p.571)). A lot has been done
to accomplish this. A lot remains to be done.
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